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HE Texas Legislature emerged as the major player in the area of
commercial law during the 1995 Survey period.' The last legisla-
tive s ssion marked not only the thirtieth anniversary of the first
adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code in Texas, 2 but also the adop-
tion of the most significant set of changes yet made to the Texas version
of the Code. The changes included a new Chapter 3 on Negotiable Instru-
ments,3 a substantially revised Chapter 4 on Bank Deposits and Collec-
tions,4 a new Chapter 8 on Investment Securities, 5 and conforming
amendments to Chapter 9 on Secured Transactions.6 Because of the ex-
tensive nature of these changes, discussion of the various revisions has
been divided between this Article and the Banking Law Survey contained
elsewhere in this volume.7 This Article includes coverage of changes
made in Chapters 8 and 9, as well as some miscellaneous changes made in
other Chapters of the Code. The Banking Law Survey covers changes
made in Chapters 3 and 4.
I. GENERAL PROVISIONS
A. CONFLICr OF LAWS
Section 1.103 of the Code states a general choice of law principle al-
lowing the parties to a transaction to choose the law of Texas or of an-
other jurisdiction to govern their rights and duties so long as the
transaction bears a reasonable relation to the state whose law is chosen,
be it a sale, a lease, or a security interest.8 In Jett Racing & Sales, Inc. v.
Transamerican Comm. Fin. Corp.,9 the court held that a "floor plan" fi-
nancing arrangement between a lender and a borrower constituted a se-
curity agreement under the Code and that a clause in the agreement
1. A Survey period generally covers cases and legislation affecting Texas law reported
from November of one year through October of the following year. Because of differences
in timing for the release of opinions for publication, motions for rehearing, and the like, a
case may be included that was reported shortly before or shortly after those dates, but the
vast majority of cases and legislation discussed are within that time frame.
2. The Uniform Commercial Code was originally adopted in Texas in the 1965 legis-
lative session with an effective date of July 1, 1966. Uniform Commercial Code, ch. 721,
§§ 1-101 to 10-105, 1965 Tex. Gen. Laws 1-316. In. 1967 it was reenacted as part of the new
Texas Business and Commerce Code Act of May 25, 1967, 60th Leg., R.S., ch. 785, 1967
Tex. Gen. Laws 2343. In this Article all references are to the Uniform Commercial Code as
enacted in chapters 1 through 11 of the Texas Business and Commerce Code, TEx. Bus. &
COM. CODE ANN. §§ 1.101-11.108 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1991 & 1994 & Supp. 1996) [here-
inafter the Code].
3. Act of May 28, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 921, §§ 1-2, 1995 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 4582
(Vernon).
4. Act of May 28, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 921, § 4, 1995 Tex. Sess Law Serv. 4582,
4626 (Vernon).
5. Act of May 27, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 962, § 1, 1995 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 4760
(Vernon).
6. Act of May 27, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 962, §§ 2-14, 1995 Tex. Sess. Law Serv.
4760, 4778 (Vernon).
7. See Banking Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 49 SMU L. REv. 695 (1996).
8. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE. ANN. § 1.105(a) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1994).
9. 892 F. Supp. 161 (S.D. Tex. 1995).
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selecting Illinois law to govern the transaction was fully appropriate. In
reaching this decision, the court noted that the issue was not whether
Texas or Illinois had the most significant contacts with the transaction,
but whether Illinois had a reasonable relation to the transaction. 10 Be-
cause the lender was located in Illinois, the loan funds were provided by
an Illinois bank and loan payments were deposited in Illinois banks, the
court concluded that the choice of Illinois law was reasonable." The
court rejected the argument that Texas had a fundamental public interest
in protecting Texas residents from usury and held that the choice of Illi-
nois law should stand regardless of any difference between Texas law and
Illinois law on the subject of usury or interest rates.' 2 The court also
showed some dissatisfaction, however, with the apparent inability of the
parties to settle their dispute without litigation and directed them to re-
spond to the court's "proposal" that mediation or arbitration be consid-
ered as an alternative to litigation.' 3
B. GOOD FAITH PURCHASE
The Code is replete with rules allocating property rights between par-
ties asserting claims to the same property. 14 In Central Appraisal Dist. v.
Dixie-Rose Jewels, Inc.,15 the conflicting claims consisted of a personal
property tax lien held by an appraisal district and a security interest held
by a bank that foreclosed on the property after the tax lien had come into
existence. Although the bank had perfected its security interest well
before the tax lien was effective, the Texas Tax Code gives tax liens prior-
ity over pre-existing security interests.' 6 Faced with this clear limitation
on its rights as a secured party, the bank argued that it qualified as a
buyer in the ordinary course of business under section 1.201 of the
Code 17 and, therefore, was protected from the lien under section 32.03 of
the Tax Code.' 8 The court held that this argument failed because the
10. Id. at 163.
11. Id.
12. On this point, the court noted that this argument had been rejected previously in
Admiral Ins. Co. v. Brinkcraft Dev., Ltd., 921 F.2d 591, 594 (5th Cir. 1991) and no subse-
quent Texas case had cast doubt on this result. Jett Racing, 892 F. Supp. at 164.
13. 892 F.Supp. at 165. The language used by the court left no doubt about the seri-
ousness of this "proposal."
14. See, e.g., TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.403 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1994) (rights
of good faith purchaser or buyer in ordinary course of business as against owner); TEX.
Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.305 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1996) (rights of holder in due
course against prior parties); TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE. ANN. § 9.301 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon
1991 & Supp. 1996) (rights of purchasers against unperfected security interests); TEX. Bus.
& COM. CODE. ANN. § 9.312 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1991 & Supp. 1996) (rights of secured
creditors inter se).
15. 894 S.W.2d 841 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1995, no writ).
16. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 32.05 (Vernon 1992).
17. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.201(9) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1994) defines the
term "buyer in the ordinary course of business."
18. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 32.03 (Vernon Supp. 1996) provides, inter alia, that a tax
lien is not enforceable against a buyer in the ordinary course of business who does not have
actual notice of the tax lien.
1996]
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definition of "buyer in the ordinary course of business" specifically ex-
cludes buyers who acquire property as security or in satisfaction of a
money debt. 19 Because the parties stipulated that the foreclosure on the
property was to satisfy a money debt, the bank did not qualify as a buyer
in the ordinary course of business and was not protected against the supe-
rior tax lien.20
In Four B's Inc. v. State,21 a pawnbroker purchased a shotgun from a
person who apparently bought it from the owner in exchange for a hot
check. The pawnshop argued that it acquired good title to the shotgun as
a good faith purchaser under section 2.403 of the Code. 22 The court held
that the case was controlled, not by the Code, but by section 47.02 of the
Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, which requires illegally obtained
property to be returned "to the person appearing by the proof to be the
owner."23 While section 47.02 requires the return of illegally acquired
property, it contains no provisions on how ownership is to be determined.
The court noted that nothing in this section indicated adoption of the
Uniform Commercial Code standards to determine good faith
purchases. 24 Referring to the general law governing pawnbrokers and to
the Texas Pawnshop Act,25 the court found a public policy that militated
against the ability of pawnshops to qualify as good faith purchasers of
stolen property and the order of the trial court that the shotgun be re-
turned to the owner was affirmed.26 Although not discussed by the court,
additional support for the public policy limiting the ability of pawnshops
to acquire goods under circumstances that might deprive prior parties of
ownership can be found in the specific exclusion of pawnbrokers from the
definition of "buyer in the ordinary course of business" in section 1.201 of
the Code.27
II. SALES OF GOODS
A. ENFORCEABILITY OF ORAL CONTRACTS
Under the Code, the basic statute of frauds rule for the sale of goods
requires a written contract signed by the party against whom enforcement
is sought if the contract calls for payment of five hundred dollars or
19. 894 S.W.2d at 843.
20. Id.
21. 902 S.W.2d 683 (Tex. App.-Austin 1995, writ denied).
22. Id. at 685. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.403(a)(2) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1994)
provides that a person with a voidable title, like that of the person who defrauded the
owner with a hot check, has power to transfer a good title to a good faith purchaser for
value even though the owner delivered the goods to the wrongdoer in exchange for a check
which is later dishonored.
23. 902 S.W.2d at 684 (quoting from TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 47.02 (Vernon
1979)).
24. Id. at 685.
25. TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 5069-51.01 to .17 (Vernon 1987 & Supp. 1996).
26. 902 S.W.2d at 685-86.
27. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.201(9) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1994).
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more.28 The Code also allows the parties to create their own statute of
frauds to govern possible modification of the basic contract by including a
provision that excludes modification or rescission except by a signed writ-
ing.29 In Brookside Farms v. Mama Rizzo's, Inc.,30 the court addressed
the question of whether oral modifications of a contract could be en-
forced when the initial contract required that any modifications be in
writing. The parties initially agreed in writing for the sale and purchase of
91,000 pounds of basil leaves under a one-year requirements contract at
an in-domestic-season price of $3.80 per pound and an out-of-domestic-
season price of $5.00 per pound. 31 Deliveries were to be made daily in
quantities ranging from 350 pounds to 800 pounds. 32 After the contract
was signed, and at the buyer's request, the seller agreed to remove the
stems from the basil leaves before they were delivered at an increased
price of $.50 per pound. The buyer promised to note this price change on
the buyer's copy of the contract; however, such notation was never made
place, although the price change did appear on the buyer's internally gen-
erated purchase orders and payment checks as well as appearing on the
seller's delivery invoices.
Besides this modification, the parties also subsequently agreed to two
additional price modifications to reflect increased costs incurred by the
seller when the buyer failed to place minimum weekly orders for approxi-
mately two months.33 These modifications were also not made in writing
as called for in the original contract. Approximately six months after the
contract began, the buyer breached by paying for eight shipments with a
check that bounced and thereafter also refused to place any further or-
ders.34 The seller sued to recover for the basil leaves already delivered
and for breach of the remaining executory portion of the requirements
contract.
In a well-written opinion, the court reasoned that, as to the goods that
had already been received and accepted, section 2.201 contains its own
statutory exception to the writing requirement and this exception would
permit the seller to recover for the basil leaves that had been delivered
but for which payment had not been made.35 As to the executory portion
28. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.201(a) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1994).
29. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.209(b) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1994).
30. 873 F. Supp. 1029 (S.D. Tex. 1995).
31. Id. at 1031.
32. Id.
33. Id. These price modifications apparently took place because the seller had entered
into its own supply contracts with foreign suppliers to obtain basil leaves when they could
not be grown domestically. When the buyer failed to order the minimum quantities called
for under the requirements contract, the seller reduced its own purchases and was forced
to pay a higher price to its own suppliers when the buyer resumed making weekly orders.
34. Id. at 1032.
35. 873 F. Supp. at 1033. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.201(c)(3) (Tex. UCC)
(Vernon 1994) provides: "(c) A contract which does not satisfy the requirements of Subsec-
tion (a) but which is valid in other respects is enforceable (3) with respect to goods for




of the contract, the court analyzed prior Texas case law on the use of
estoppel as an exception to the statute of frauds and found that Texas has
recognized the doctrine of promissory estoppel to allow a party who has
reasonably relied on the oral promise of another to reduce an oral agree-
ment to writing to estop the other party from asserting the general statute
of frauds as a defense to enforcement of the contract.36 Based on both
the statutory exception and the ground of estoppel, the court held the
contract was enforceable for goods already received and accepted and for
the remaining executory portion of the contract term.37 The court specifi-
cally noted that, "[b]ecause of the general paucity of relevant Texas au-
thority presented" by the parties, it did not reach the question of whether
the purchase orders and invoices might themselves take the case out of
the statute of frauds. 38 Although not mentioned in its opinion, to the ex-
tent the court was, in effect, making a policy decision to extend the estop-
pel doctrine approved under the general statute of frauds to the section
2.201 statute of frauds stated in the Code, it could have noted that the
legislature has also approved such extension by adopting a statutory es-
toppel exception in section 2A.201 of the Code.39 Although this provi-
sion applies only to leases of goods and not to the sale of goods, the
legislature rarely amends provisions of the Code in a piece-meal fashion
and no substantial revision of Chapter 2 has yet been introduced for con-
sideration. As a statement of policy regarding the use of estoppel, the
adoption of Chapter 2A in 1993 should carry some weight, particularly
since the estoppel exception was added as a non-uniform Texas amend-
ment to reflect what was perceived as the majority rule favoring use of
estoppel as an exception to the statute of frauds.40
A different statute of frauds issue was presented in Floors Unlimited,
Inc. v. Fieldcrest Cannon, Inc.,41 where a carpet retailer entered into an
oral dealership agreement with a manufacturer which was to continue in-
definitely unless terminated by the manufacturer for "good cause."
Three issues were before the court. First, was a contract for an indefinite
term that could be terminated only for cause within the proscription of
the general Texas statute of frauds requiring contracts not to be per-
formed within a year to be in writing.42 Second, was section 2.201 of the
36. 873 F. Supp. at 1033, (citing "Moore" Burger, Inc. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 492
S.W.2d 934, 937 (Tex. 1972)), (a real estate case decided under the general statute of frauds
contained in TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 26.01 (Vernon 1991)).
37. 873 F. Supp. at 1034.
38. Id. at 1036 n.5.
39. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2A.201(d)(4) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1994).
40. Chapter 2A was added to the Code by Act of May 30, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 570
§§1-16, 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws 2098 (Vernon) and now appears as TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE
ANN. §§ 2A.101-2A.532 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1994). An explanation of the reason for in-
clusion of the estoppel exception appears in the State Bar Committee Comments to
§ 2A.201.
41. 55 F.3d 181 (5th Cir. 1995).
42. Id. at 184. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 26.01(b)(6) (Vernon 1994) requires
that contracts not to be performed within a year be in writing and signed by the party to be
charged to be enforceable.
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Code applicable to a dealership contract under which a dealer engages to
sell goods supplied by a manufacturer. 43 Third, did a fiduciary relation-
ship exist between the manufacturer and the dealer."
Although the court had previously held that contracts for an indefinite
term were required to be in writing under the general Texas statute of
frauds,4 5 and had subsequently followed this decision under the rule of
stare decisis applicable in the Fifth Circuit,46 a review of more recent
Texas cases convinced the court that Texas law did not require contracts
for an indefinite term to be in writing to be enforceable.4 7 As to the first
issue, therefore, the court concluded that the oral dealership contract did
not need to be in writing to be enforceable.48 In regard to the second
issue, the court noted the apparent absence of any Texas cases on
whether dealership contracts fall within the statute of frauds provisions in
section 2.201 of the Code.4 9 Because the district court had not yet ad-
dressed this issue, the question was remanded to the district court and the
court declined to certify the question to the Texas Supreme Court until
the district court had an opportunity to consider it.5o As to the third is-
sue, the court summarily concluded that the evidence was insufficient to
show that a fiduciary relationship existed between the manufacturer and
the dealer.51
B. WARRANTIES AND DISCLAIMERS
The Texas law of warranty is complex. The complexity arises in part
because a breach of warranty constitutes a specific cause of action under
the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA) and carries with it the
possibility of recovering treble damages.52 Furthermore, because the
43. Id. at 187.
44. Id.
45. Falconer v. Soltex Polymer Corp., 886 F.2d 1312 (5th Cir. 1989) (unpublished
opinion).
46. Pruitt v. Levi Strauss & Co., 932 F.2d 458 (5th Cir. 1991). Although the court
expressed doubt about its prior decision, it felt compelled to adhere to its earlier decision
because the rules of the Fifth Circuit provide that one panel cannot overturn a decision of
another panel absent en banc reconsideration or a state court decision that is clearly con-
trary to the federal decision. Id.
47. 55 F.3d at 185. The two cases cited by the court as contrary state authority were
Gerstacker v. Blum Consulting Eng'rs., Inc., 884 S.W.2d 845 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1994, writ
denied) and Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Portilla, 836 S.W.2d 664 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1992), affd on other grounds, 879 S.W.2d 47 (Tex. 1994), both of which were de-
cided after the unpublished decision in Falconer v. Soltex Polymer Corp., 886 F.2d 1312
(5th Cir. 1989).
48. 55 F.3d at 186.
49. Id. at 187.
50. Id. Given the lack of Texas case law on this issue, practitioners may wish to track
this case occasionally to see if an answer to the dealership question is ultimately reported.
51. Id. at 188. On this point the court noted that, "Under Texas law, a fiduciary duty
will not be lightly created as it imposes extraordinary duties," citing Gillum v. Republic
Health Corp., 778 S.W.2d 558, 567 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989, no writ).
52. The Deceptive Trade Practices Act appears in TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN.
§§17.41-.63 (Vernon 1991 & Supp. 1996). Breach of an express or implied warranty is listed
as a DTPA cause of action in TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(a)(2) (Vernon 1994 &
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Texas Supreme Court has ruled that the DTPA does not create any war-
ranties, but that any warranty on which a DTPA claim is based must be
found outside the DTPA itself,53 statutory warranties under the Code
have often figured in DTPA cases. 54 Plaintiffs' attorneys have also had
some success in persuading the courts to create additional common law
warranties. 55 This interaction between the Code, the DTPA, and the
common law has also created difficulty in determining if a particular rule
should be limited to one class of cases or another, or if the rule is gener-
ally applicable to all of the classes. Thus, in Melody Home Manufacturing
Co. v. Barnes,56 the characterization by the court that a consumer would
have the benefit of an implied warranty of good and workmanlike repair
in actions "under the DTPA''57 left open the question of whether the war-
ranty existed only in DTPA cases (with a two year limitations period) or
would be available in non-DTPA cases as well (with a four year limita-
tions period). While this question was eventually answered in Walker v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co. ,58 where the court held that the Melody Home war-
ranty was not limited to actions brought under the DTPA, but could be
used as the basis for an ordinary breach of warranty claim, the general
uncertainty surrounding the relationship between Code warranties, com-
mon law warranties, and the DTPA remains. 59
Supp. 1996). The DTPA was substantially amended by Act of May 19, 1995, 74th Leg.,
R.S., ch. 414, 1995 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 2988 (Vernon).
53. La Sara Grain Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 673 S.W.2d 558, 565 (Tex. 1984).
54. Warranties recognized by the Code appear in TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN.
§§ 2.312-.315; (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1994) and include implied warranties of good title(§ 2.312); express warranties (§ 2.313); implied warranties of merchantability (§ 2.314); and
implied warranties of fitness for a particular purpose (§ 2.315). One or more of these war-
ranties has frequently been used as the basis for a DTPA claim. See, e.g., Plas-Tex, Inc. v.
United States Steel Corp., 772 S.W.2d 442 (Tex. 1989) (implied warranty of
merchantability and DTPA), Luna v. North Star Dodge Sales, Inc., 667 S.W.2d 115 (Tex.
1984) (combining claims for breach of express warranty, unconscionability, and DTPA vio-
lation); Big H Auto Auction, Inc. v. Saenz Motors, 665 S.W.2d 756 (Tex. 1984) (warranty of
good title and DTPA).
55. See, e.g., Melody Home Mfg. Co. v. Barnes, 741 S.W.2d 349 (Tex. 1987) (holding
that repair or modification of tangible goods or property includes a warranty that the re-
pairs or modifications will be done in a good and workmanlike manner); Evans v. J. Stiles,
Inc., 689 S.W.2d 399 (Tex. 1985) (construction of a residence includes implied warranty of
habitability and a separate warranty of good workmanship; breach of either warranty can
give rise to an action for damages); Kish v. Van Note, 692 S.W.2d 463 (Tex. 1985) (warranty
of good workmanship in construction extends to peripheral construction as well as to the
dwelling itself). Not all attempts to create common law warranties have been successful,
however. During the Survey period, the court refused to extend the Melody Home war-
ranty to future land development services undertaken by a developer that were not pro-
vided as part of the underlying transaction. Parkway Co. v. Woodruff, 901 S.W.2d 434, 440
(Tex. 1995).
56. 741 S.W.2d 349, 353-54 (Tex. 1987).
57. Id. at 355.
58. 853 F.2d 355, 358-59 (5th Cir. 1988).
59. Another example of this uncertainty is illustrated by Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v.
FDP Corp., 811 S.W.2d 572 (Tex. 1991) where the court reviewed the Code standards for
limitations of liability for breach of warranty to determine if such a limitation was effective
for an express warranty contained in a non-Code services contract. Here again the ques-
tion becomes how far such cases can be cross-cited in DTPA, common law, and Code
litigation.
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During the Survey period, interaction between these areas surfaced
again in Prudential Ins. Co. v. Jefferson Assoc., Ltd.60 where the court
held that an "as is" disclaimer contained in a contract for the sale of re-
alty negated the element of producing cause required to recover under
the DTPA.61 In support of this holding, the court cited both Code cases
and DTPA cases. 62 The court also addressed the question of whether an
"as is" disclaimer constituted an impermissible waiver of rights under the
DTPA.63 On this issue, the court held that such a disclaimer did not pur-
port to waive the right to sue under the DTPA, but only affected the
element of producing cause because the purchaser was relying on his own
examination of the property and not on any express or implied warran-
ties.64 Despite amendment of the DTPA in 1995 to permit a waiver of
DTPA rights if the statutory formula is followed, an "as is" disclaimer
may provide broader protection to a seller because of the breadth of the
court's holding on the effect such disclaimers have on the element of pro-
ducing cause under the DTPA.65
Disclaimers of warranty are also effective under the Code, of course, if
they adhere to the statutory requirements of clarity and conspicuousness,
but only if they are provided to the buyer!66 In Walter Oil & Gas Corp. v.
NS Group, Inc.,67 a buyer purchased pipe to be used in the construction
of an offshore oil pipeline from a pipe retailer who bought the pipe from
a pipe manufacturer. The contract between the manufacturer and the
retailer conspicuously disclaimed any implied warranties by the manufac-
turer. The contract between the retailer and the buyer conspicuously dis-
60. 896 S.W.2d 156 (Tex. 1995).
61. Id. at 161. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(a) (Vernon 1994 & Supp. 1996)
(the consumer "may maintain an action where any of the following constitute a producing
cause of economic damages or damages for mental anguish [listing causes of action].")
62. The cases included Mid Continent Aircraft Corp. v. Curry County Spraying Serv.,
Inc., 572 S.W.2d 308 (Tex. 1978) (combining claims based on strict liability in tort and
implied warranties under the Code); Dubow v. Dragon, 746 S.W.2d 857 (Tex. App.-Dal-
las 1988, no writ) (real estate case holding producing cause of injury by seller's misrepre-
sentation did not exist where buyers inspected property).
63. 896 S.W.2d at 163-64.
64. Id.
65. As amended in the 1995 legislative session, the DTPA now provides a method to
waive the right to sue under the DTPA. See Act of June 8, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 414,
§ 1, 1995 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 2988, 2988-89 (Vernon) revising TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE
ANN. § 17.42 (Vernon 1994). A statutory waiver form is contained in TEX. Bus. & COM.
CODE ANN. § 17.42(c)(3) (Vernon 1994 & Supp. 1996). There is no special form for an "as
is" disclaimer, but the holding of the court in Dresser Indus., Inc. v. Page Petroleum, Inc.,
853 S.W.2d 505 (Tex. 1993) makes it clear that a disclaimer must be conspicuous and that
determination of conspicuousness is a question of law for the court and not a question of
fact for the jury. The court reasoned that the "[UCCI standard for conspicuousness in
Code cases is familiar to the courts of this state and conforms to our objectives of commer-
cial certainty and uniformity." 853 S.W.2d at 511. The court applied TEX. Bus. & COM.
CODE ANN. § 1.201(10) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1991) to an indemnity clause used in an oil
well servicing contract.
66. The requirements for disclaiming warranties under Chapter 2 appear in TEX. Bus.
& COM. CODE ANN. § 2.316 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1994).
67. 867 F. Supp. 549 (S.D. Tex. 1994).
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claimed any warranties by the retailer. The buyer, however, was never
advised of the manufacturer's disclaimer.
After the pipeline was completed, pressure testing revealed that some
of the weld seams were defective. The manufacturer refused to meet the
buyer's demands to correct the problem and the buyer ultimately ob-
tained pipe from another source to replace the pipeline. 68 The buyer
sued for the cost of replacement and for lost profits, alleging breach of
warranty, breach of contract, and negligence. The breach of contract and
negligence claims were ultimately dropped from the case and the sole
claim before the court was for breach of the implied warranty of
merchantability by the manufacturer. The manufacturer argued that
there were no Texas cases addressing the issue of whether a commercial
buyer could recover against a remote manufacturer when the parties
were not in privity. On this point the court noted that Nobility Homes of
Tex., Inc. v. Shivers,69 had extensively analyzed the warranty provisions
under the Code and had allowed recovery for breach of implied warranty
by a buyer against a remote manufacturer without distinguishing between
consumer buyers and commercial buyers.70 The court further noted that
Nobility had later been applied in Clark v. DeLaval Separator Corp.71 to
permit recovery by a commercial buyer against a remote manufacturer
for breach of warranty.72 The court held, therefore, that lack of privity
was not a bar to the buyer's claim.73 The manufacturer also argued that
the retailer's disclaimer was effective to disclaim the manufacturer's war-
ranty even though the manufacturer's own disclaimer was never given to
the buyer. This argument was also addressed in Clark where the court
held that a manufacturer remained liable for breach of implied warranties
unless the manufacturer's own disclaimer was given to the buyer or the
manufacturer's liability was explicitly disclaimed in the contract between
the retailer and the buyer.74 Because neither event had occurred, the
court held that the buyer's breach of implied warranty claim remained
viable.75
In Lester v. Logan,76 the facts raised an interesting question about the
difference between the implied warranty of merchantability and the im-
plied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose. A warranty of
merchantability is a warranty that goods are of fair average quality, while
a warranty of fitness for a particular purpose is a warranty that the goods
68. Id. at 551.
69. 557 S.W.2d 77 (Tex. 1977).
70. 867 F. Supp. at 554.
71. 639 F.2d 1320, 1322 (5th Cir. 1981).
72. 867 F. Supp. at 555.
73. Id.
74. 639 F.2d at 1323-24.
75. 867 F. Supp. at 555.
76. 893 S.W.2d 570 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1994), writ denied per curiam, 907
S.W.2d 452 (Tex. 1995).
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are fit for some special purpose intended by the buyer.77 The dispute in
Lester arose when hay supplied by the seller caused the death of several
head of cattle owned by the buyer because of an excess level of nitrates in
the hay.78 The jury found the hay was merchantable, but that it was unfit
for the particular purpose of livestock consumption.79 The court of ap-
peals held the evidence was sufficient to support these findings by the
jury.80 Unfortunately, the court did not discuss the question of how the
feeding of hay to livestock was a "particular purpose." Such a use would
seem to be an ordinary use included in the warranty of merchantability
rather than a use for a particular purpose and the case offers little gui-
dance for distinguishing between these two warranties. 81
III. LEASES OF GOODS
A. DETERMINATION OF LESSOR'S DAMAGES
Chapter 2A was adopted in Texas during the 1993 legislative session as
an addition to the Code to cover leases of goods, a subject that had not
been previously codified.82 Although decided under the common law ex-
isting prior to the adoption of Chapter 2A, Swindell v. Bell Atlantic
Tricon Leasing Corp.83 deserves mention because the result is consistent
with the provisions of Chapter 2A and the case illustrates an important
aspect of damage calculation under this recent addition to the Code.
The lessee in Swindell contracted for the lease of a computer system
under a lease calling for sixty monthly payments. The remedies in the
lease agreement provided that, upon default by the lessee, the lessor
could accelerate the entire amount of unpaid rent for the balance of the
lease term and recover that amount in addition to past due rent, less any
amount received by the lessor from rental or sale of the equipment.84
77. Compare TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.314 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1994) (war-
ranty of merchantability) with TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.315 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon
1994) (warranty of fitness for a particular purpose).
78. 893 S.W.2d at 573.
79. Id. at 575.
80. Id.
81. Such guidance would be useful because there has been relatively little litigation
under TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.315 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1994) on warranties of
fitness for a particular purpose, but considerable litigation on the warranty of
merchantability under TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.314 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1994).
The only allusion the court made to the difference between these two warranties was a
description of testimony by the buyer that he consulted with the seller about cattle feed
and relied on the seller's skill and judgment to obtain hay fit for his cattle to consume. 893
S.W.2d at 574-75. While the buyer's testimony tracked the statutory elements of a war-
ranty of fitness for a particular purpose, it still failed to explain how feeding hay to cattle
was a "particular purpose" for hay. One would have expected additional evidence or ex-
planation about other, non-trivial, uses for hay to show that use as cattle feed was a "par-
ticular use" as contrasted to an "ordinary use."
82. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 2A.101-2A.532 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1994).
Chapter 2A became effective on September 1, 1993.
83. 889 S.W.2d 5 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1994, no writ).
84. Id. at 7. The lease also had provisions allowing recovery of sale or rental expenses
and taxes. Id.
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Upon default by the lessee, the lessor repossessed and later sold the com-
puter equipment. 85 The lessee argued that requiring payment of rent for
the balance of the lease term when the lessee no longer had the use of the
goods overcompensated the lessor and was "a measure of recovery far in
excess of 'just compensation."'' 86 The court found that prior Texas cases
had upheld leases allowing the recovery of unaccrued rent and, noting
that all but two rental payments had become due by the time the com-
puter was repossessed, the court ruled that the terms of the lease agree-
ment would be enforced.87 Judgment was affirmed in favor of the lessor
in an amount that included the unaccrued rent.88
This result is consistent with the liquidated damages rule stated in sec-
tion 2A.504 of the Code. 89 The important point to note is that this liqui-
dated damages rule is substantially more flexible than the liquidated
damages rule applied to sales cases in section 2.718.90 As illustrated by
Swindell, the inclusion of unaccrued rent in a liquidated damages formula
has been acceptable to the courts under prior law and should present no
difficulties under the statutory formulation under the Code.91
IV. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS
In one respect all of the negotiable instrument cases decided in this
Survey period might be regarded as mere historical artifacts since a new
Chapter 3 was adopted in the 1995 legislative session. 92 Despite substan-




88. 889 S.W.2d at 8.
89. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2A.504(a) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1994) provides:
Damages payable by either party for default or any other act or omission,
including indemnity for loss or diminution of anticipated tax benefits or loss
or damage to lessor's residual interest, may be liquidated in the lease agree-
ment but only at an amount or by a formula that is reasonable in light of the
then anticipated harm caused by the default or other act or omission. In a
consumer lease, a term fixing liquidated damages that are unreasonably large
in light of the actual harm is unenforceable as a penalty.
90. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.718 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1994) provides:
Damages for breach by either party may be liquidated in the agreement
but only at an amount which is reasonable in the light of the anticipated or
actual harm caused by the breach, the difficulties of proof of loss, and the
inconvenience or non-feasibility of otherwise obtaining an adequate remedy.
A term fixing unreasonably large liquidated damages is void as a penalty.
91. The Official Comment to TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2A.504 (Tex. UCC)
(Vernon 1994) describes a liquidated damages formula quite similar to the one upheld in
Swindell. It must be noted, however, that Texas adopted a non-uniform amendment to this
section by specifying that liquidated damages must not be unreasonably large in relation to
the actual damages in a consumer lease. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2A.504 St.
Bar Comm. Cmt. (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1994). In a consumer lease, a provision allowing
acceleration of unaccrued rent may be unreasonably large and open the door to a DTPA
claim by the aggrieved consumer against the lessor seeking to enforce such a clause. The
DTPA appears as TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-.63 (Vernon 1991 & Supp. 1996).
92. Chapter 3 was replaced by the Act of May 28, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 921, §§ 1-2,
1995 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 4582 (Vernon).
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the prior law, and much of that structure has been retained. It is likely,
therefore, that many cases decided under the old Chapter 3 will continue
to be cited as authority when the substance of the old rule has been re-
tained, though perhaps in reworded and renumbered form, in the new
Chapter 3. The following discussion will note the correlation between the
old and new versions of Chapter 3 as they apply to the facts of individual
cases, but the reader should consult the Banking Law Survey for further
discussion of the revised Chapter 3.93
A. FORM OF NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS
Section 3.104 is the primary section dealing with the form of negotiable
instruments under both the old and the new versions of Chapter 3.94 In
Bailey, Vaught, Robertson & Co. v. Remington Inv. Inc.,95 a note provided
that the interest rate was "lender's prime plus one percent. ' 96 The court
recognized that the Texas Supreme Court had previously held that varia-
ble rate notes could meet the formal requirement of a "sum certain"
under section 3.104 by reference to a prime rate if the rate was publicly
available and could be determined by an interested person. 97 In Bailey,
however, the original lender was a bank that subsequently failed and the
holder of the note was an assignee from the FDIC.98 Because of the bank
failure, there was no longer a lender's prime rate to use for the calcula-
tion of interest and, in the view of the court, this made the note non-
negotiable. 99 Although the assignee lost this summary judgment battle, it
did not lose the collection war because the court also held that the as-
signee could substitute a reasonable rate of interest, but such substitution
was a question of fact that could not be resolved on the summary judg-
ment evidence before the court. 100 The revised Chapter 3 substitutes the
phrase "fixed amount of money, with or without interest" for the phrase
"sum certain in money" as well as making it clear that variable rate notes
are negotiable. 1 1 The result in Bailey would remain the same under the
revised Code.
93. See Banking Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 49 S.M.U. L. Rev. 695 (1996).
Because of the limited space available in a Survey a more extensive discussion of Chapters
3 and 4 may be found in JOHN KRAHMER & AARON CLEMENTS, TEXAS COMMERCIAL LAW
FOR BANK LAWYERS: 1995 SUPPLEMENT (1995).
94. Compare TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.104 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1994) with
TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.104 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1996).
95. 888 S.W.2d 860 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1994, no writ).
96. Id. at 865.
97. Id. at 864, (citing Amberboy v. Societe de Banque Privee, 831 S.W. 2d 793, 797(Tex. 1992)).
98. 888 S.W.2d at 863.
99. Id. at 868.
100. Id. at 867.
101. Compare TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 3.104(a) & 3.106 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon
1994) with TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 3.104(a) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1996).
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B. FORM OF INDORSEMENT AND CONVERSION OF INSTRUMENTS
Both versions of the Code state that instruments made payable to the
order of two or more persons are "payable to all of them and may be
negotiated, discharged or enforced only by all of them.' 10 2 Depending
upon one's interpretation of the opinion in Benchmark Bank v. State
Farm Lloyds,103 that case is either equally right or equally wrong regard-
less of which version of the Code is used. In Benchmark, an insurer is-
sued a total of four drafts in payment of a fire insurance claim. The first
two drafts named both the homeowner-mortgagors and the mortgagee as
joint payees and were delivered to the homeowners.10 4 After the mortga-
gee notified the insurer that the homeowners had forged the mortgagee's
indorsement on these drafts, the insurer nonetheless delivered a third
draft to the homeowners, but sent the fourth and final draft to the mort-
gagee. 10 5 In a curious opinion, the court reasoned that "[p]ayment to and
possession of a draft by one joint payee is constructive possession by the
other joint payee" and that the issue in the case was not whether the
homeowners forged the mortgagee's indorsement, but whether the in-
surer discharged its obligation under the insurance policy by making pay-
ment on drafts that bore the "apparent endorsements" of both payees. 1°6
Emphasizing that its decision was based on the facts and circumstances of
the case before it, the court held that the insurer had discharged its obli-
gations by payment of the drafts and was not liable to the mortgagee. 107
According to the court, the mortgagee's recourse for any forged indorse-
ment was against the homeowners and not against the insurer.10 8 If this
opinion is read literally, checks made payable to joint payees and deliv-
ered to one of them who then forged the indorsements of the other payee
or payees could never serve as the basis for a conversion claim against the
payor. This result would make no sense under either the old or new
Code. 109 The emphasis by the court that its decision was based on the
facts of this particular case leads one to believe that the court was either
dissatisfied with the record or that it was rendering a decision based on
factual nuances not fully spelled out in its opinion. 110 Based on either
102. Compare TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.116(2) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1994)
with TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.110(d) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1996).
103. 893 S.W.2d 649 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1994, no writ).
104. Id. at 650.
105. Id. There is no explanation in the opinion about why the third draft was delivered
to the homeowners despite notification of the prior forgeries.
106. 893 S.W.2d at 651 (citing Stone v. First City Bank, 794 S.W.2d 537, 542 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 1990, writ denied)).
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. This result would make meaningless the provisions requiring indorsements by all
of the joint payees in either TEX. Bus & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.116(2) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon
1994) or TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.110(d) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1996), as
well as doing considerable violence to TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.419(a)(3) (Tex.
UCC) (Vernon 1994) and TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.420(a) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon
Supp. 1996).
110. At least three times in a rather brief opinion, the court alludes to "the circum-
stances of this case" or to the "undisputed facts presented." See 893 S.W.2d at 650-51.
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reading, however, the opinion is unsatisfactory because of its lack of real
explanation or analysis and may even be dangerous because of its overly
broad language regarding indorsements by joint payees. To the extent
the revised Code clarifies the right of joint payees to maintain conversion
actions, this case is a prime candidate for relegation to the historical scrap
heap and a later court could readily use the language of the revision to
accomplish this purpose.11'
Lakeland Pipe & Supply, Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank" 2 involved a conver-
sion claim by the named corporate payee on two checks against a deposi-
tary bank that had taken the checks for deposit in an account bearing a
different corporate name than that of the payee. Neither check carried
an authorized indorsement by the payee, although both had indorsements
by a corporate officer and indorsements in the name of the "other" cor-
poration.113 The bank made no inquiries in regard to either check to de-
termine if the indorsements or deposits were authorized even though the
officer who deposited the checks was known to the bank to have a history
of writing checks on nonsufficient funds (NSF) drawn on his personal ac-
count. 114 After reviewing the summary judgment evidence, the court
held that the bank failed as a matter of law to deal with the checks in a
commercially reasonable manner and was liable to the payee for the pro-
ceeds of both checks." 5
Although Lakeland was decided as a matter of law, the scenario points
to what is likely to be a much litigated question under the revised Code.
Among other changes, the new Chapter 3 purports to distinguish between
unauthorized signatures by agents and forgeries by other persons. 1 6 The
revision also introduces a comparative negligence scheme for the alloca-
tion of loss in the case of forgeries or in the case of fraudulent indorse-
ments by employees entrusted with responsibility for dealing with
instruments." 7 In the case of a conversion action, however, like the one
presented in Lakeland, the revised Code does not use a comparative neg-
ligence approach."18 A substantial amount of litigation, therefore, is
likely to center on the question of whether a particular indorsement is
"forged" or "unauthorized" and what this distinction (if there really is
111. In the revised Code, TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.420(a) (Tex. UCC),
(Vernon Supp. 1996) now speaks to the rights of co-payees to maintain actions for conver-
sion, a subject not addressed by the prior version of TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.419
(Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1994), and the Official Comments discuss forgeries by a joint payee as
well. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.420 cmt. 1 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1996).
112. 899 S.W.2d 230 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied).
113. Id. at 232.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 233.
116. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.406 cmt. 2 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1996)
which states in part, "Unauthorized signature is a broader concept that includes not only
forgery but also the signature of an agent which does not bind the principal under the law
of agency. The agency cases are resolved independently under agency law." Id.
117. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE. ANN. §§ 3.405(b) & 3.406(b) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon
Supp. 1996).
118. TEX. Bus. & CoM. CODE. ANN. § 3.420 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1996).
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one) is supposed to mean in the context of a conversion claim. White and
Summers have recently noted,
[O]ne set of events arising out of a series of signatures that are held
to be 'forgeries' will lead to an allocation scheme depending heavily
on comparative negligence yet nearly identical disputes arising out of
signatures that are unauthorized but technically not forgeries will by-
pass the comparative negligence rules found in 3-404 et seq. and will
instead leave 100 percent of the loss on the downstream bank, or on
the upstream employer of the embezzler. 119
In cases where a bank has failed to act in a commercially reasonable
manner as a matter of law, as in Lakeland, the result should be the same
under either version of the Code; however, if the question is deemed to
be a matter of fact, the question of whether an indorsement was "forged"
or "unauthorized" will be a matter of substantial concern.
C. ENFORCEMENT OF INSTRUMENTS
The standards for enforcing a note on a motion for summary judgment
are well-established under Texas law. The plaintiff must (1) produce the
note or account for its absence, (2) show that he or she is the holder of
the note, (3) prove that the defendant is a party liable on the note, and
(4) prove the balance due. 120 Ownership may be shown by producing a
note made payable or indorsed to the plaintiff or accompanied by affida-
vit testimony showing transfer or assignment to the plaintiff.12' During
the Survey period, these standards were applied in Blankenship v. Rob-
ins122 and Bean v. Bluebonnet Savings Bank 23 where the plaintiffs were
allowed to recover in the absence of any evidence of a defense to pay-
ment. 124 Application of the same standards resulted in a different out-
come, however, in First Gibraltar Bank v. Farley125 where inconsistencies
in an affidavit of ownership introduced by the holder led the court to
conclude that a material issue of fact existed as to the ownership of the
note, hence summary judgment was denied.' 26
Windham v. Alexander, Weston & Poehner, P.C.127 also concerned the
standards for summary judgment enforcement of a note, but the defend-
119. 2 JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: PRAC-
TITIONER TREATISE SERIES 217 (4th ed. 1995).
120. See, e.g., Edlund v. Bounds, 842 S.W.2d 719, 724 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, writ
denied) (stating requirements for enforcement of notes); Groschke v. Gabriel, 824 S.W.2d
607, 610 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, writ denied) (same).
121. Zarges v. Bevan, 652 S.W.2d 368, 369 (Tex. 1983) (absent contrary evidence, affi-
davit testimony together with a copy of a note proves ownership for purposes of summary
judgment); Jernigan v. Bank One, 803 S.W.2d 774, 776 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1991, no writ) (proof that note owned by plaintiff was lost and proof of terms allows owner
to recover).
122. 899 S.W.2d 236 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.1 1994, no writ).
123. 884 S.W.2d 520 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1994, no writ).
124. 899 S.W.2d at 239; 884 S.W.2d at 523.
125. 895 S.W.2d 425 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1995, writ denied).
126. Id. at 429.
127. 887 S.W.2d 182 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1994, writ denied).
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ant alleged inadequacy of consideration and duress as defenses to pay-
ment. 128 In the course of a divorce proceeding, the jury found that the
defendant should pay her attorneys $43,000 as fees for representing her in
the divorce. After trial, but before a final divorce decree was rendered,
the defendant signed a note for some $62,000 in favor of her attorneys. 129
In the action to enforce this note, the defendant argued that the consider-
ation for the note was inadequate because it was in an amount greater
than that found by the jury.130 The court held that this argument was
unavailing because representation in the divorce proceeding could be suf-
ficient consideration for a note in the amount of $62,000 and the law does
not generally measure the value of consideration unless it is grossly inad-
equate.13' As to the duress argument, however, the court held that the
difference between the amount found by the jury and the amount de-
manded by the attorneys might be the basis for a valid claim of duress if
the defendant had not agreed to pay the larger amount prior to signing
the note.' 32 Because of the disputed facts on the issue of duress, sum-
mary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs was reversed and the case was
remanded for trial. 133
None of the cases regarding enforcement of notes in a summary judg-
ment proceeding should be affected by the revised Chapter 3 because the
standards for establishing the right to recover remain essentially the
same.134
D. STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS FOR NOTES
After the decision in Jackson v. Thweatt, 35 assignees from the FDIC
could rest more easily knowing they had the benefit of the six-year fed-
eral limitations period instead of the shorter four-year limitations period
allowed by state law. 136 This comfort has turned out to be short-lived,
128. Id. at 184.
129. Id at 183.
130. Id. at 184.
131. Id.
132. 887 S.W.2d at 185. The court reasoned that if the attorneys were merely demand-
ing that the defendant sign a note to evidence an amount already owed to them under an
agreement between the parties, it would not have been wrongful to threaten to cease rep-
resentation of the defendant during the still-pending divorce proceeding. On the other
hand, if the demand was for an amount greater than that owed, the circumstances sur-
rounding the demand might constitute duress.
133. Id.
134. Compare TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.307 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1994) with
TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.308 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1996). The only signifi-
cant change is that an undisclosed principal may now be liable on an instrument under the
revised Code if the instrument has been signed by an authorized representative, even if the
principal is not named in the instrument. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.402(a)(Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1996). In such cases, the holder has the burden of establishing
that the undisclosed principal is liable on the instrument as a represented person. TEX.
Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.308 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1996).
135. See Jackson v. Thweatt, 883 S.W.2d 171 (Tex. 1994), cert denied sub nom. Weath-
erly v. Federal Debt. Mgt., Inc., 115 S. Ct. 196 (1994).
136. The six-year federal rule appears in 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(14) (Supp. 11989). The
state rule appears in TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 16.004, 16.035 (Vernon 1986).
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however, if the assignee acquired the paper under a transfer agreement
allowing the assignor to retain federal claims and defenses. In two cases
decided during the Survey period,137 the assignors were no doubt sur-
prised to learn that their transfer agreements contained boilerplate lan-
guage that allowed the court to deny them the benefit of the six-year
federal limitations period and left them subject to the four-year state rule.
Although the precise language of the transfer agreements varied, both
courts reached the conclusion that the agreements limited the rights
transferred to the assignee and caused the seller to retain the benefit of
the six-year federal rule.138 The lesson to assignors is clear: Despite the
general rule that a transfer from the FDIC includes the right to enforce a
note during the six-year federal limitations period, the terms of the trans-
fer agreement may cut off that right.139
Under the new Chapter 3, disputes about applying the six-year federal
rule or the four-year state rule should disappear because the revision al-
lows for a new six-year state law limitations period for the enforcement of
notes.140 The revision does create a new "four v. six" dispute; however,
non-negotiable notes, which are not covered by the new Chapter 3, re-
main subject to the four-year limitations period.141 Notes secured by
liens on real property will cause similar and, perhaps, more complex dis-
putes. It is not clear whether the new limitations period under Chapter 3
or the shorter limitations period to recover deficiencies after nonjudicial
foreclosures on real estate should control. 142
Limitations figured in a different way in Miller, Hiersche, Martens &
137. General Fin. Serv. v. Practice Place, Inc., 897 S.W.2d 516 (Tex. App.-Ft. Worth
1995, no writ); Cadle Co. v. Weaver, 897 S.W.2d 814 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1994, writ denied),
cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 2002, (1995).
138. 897 S.W.2d at 522-23; 897 S.W.2d at 818.
139. In Weaver, the appellant noted in its brief that the FDIC had changed its practice
of making limited assignments. 897 S.W.2d at 818. The court pointed out, however, that it
was required to address the transfer agreement as written. To the extent assignors still
hold notes purchased through the liquidation of failed financial institutions, the transfer
agreements should be reviewed to determine if they contain a clause reserving federal
rights to the seller in order to avoid an unexpected limitations defense being raised in suits
to enforce such notes.
140. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.118(a) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1996).
141. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.102(a) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1996). The
requirements for negotiability appear in TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.104 (Tex.
UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1996).
142. This uncertainty has been noted by the State Bar U.C.C. Committee in its Com-
ment to TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.118 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1996) where it
states, in part:
[B]ecause of their particular nature, the statute of limitations provisions of
sections 16.035 and 16.036 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code,
relating to actions with respect to debts secured by liens on real property,
and section 51.003 of the Texas Property Code, relating to actions to recover
deficiencies after nonjudicial foreclosures, should be interpreted to control,
in appropriate circumstances, over the provisions of section 3.118. (Emphasis
added.)
The Committee did not describe what it considered to be "appropriate circumstances"
and this will no doubt be a fruitful source of dispute.
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Hayward, P.C. v. Bent Tree National Bank143 where the court ruled that
the holder of a note barred by limitations was still entitled to foreclose on
collateral in the possession holder's to satisfy the barred debt.144 The
court explained that barring a debt only bars the remedy and does not
destroy the debt itself. If a creditor has possession of property pledged as
collateral for a debt, the property may be applied against the debt be-
cause the right to assert the bar of limitations is a right personal to the
debtor and does not extend to the collateral. 145
V. BANK TRANSACTIONS
In addition to adopting a new Chapter 3, the legislature substantially
revised Chapter 4 of the Code, which governs Bank Deposits and Collec-
tions.146 The legislative changes are discussed in detail in the Banking
Law Survey.147
A. COLLECTING BANK'S RIGHT OF CHARGE-BACK
In Bill Hart Auto Sales, Inc. v. Comerica Bank-Texas,148 two checks
were erroneously deposited in the plaintiffs account at a collecting bank.
After the error was discovered, the plaintiff authorized transfer of the
erroneous deposits to another account. After the transfers were made,
the payor bank dishonored the checks. For reasons that are not clear in
the opinion, the payor filed an interpleader action and tendered the
amount of the checks into the registry of the court. The plaintiff inter-
vened in that action and received payment of the funds that were inter-
pled. The plaintiff then commenced another lawsuit against the collecting
bank on the theory that the collecting bank had improperly charged-back
the amount of the two checks. 149 The court held that the plaintiff was
barred from any recovery against the collecting bank because of res judi-
cata as the bank was a party in the interpleader action and the plaintiff
expressly released the collecting bank from any further causes of action.
As an independent basis for its decision, the court also noted that section
4.212 of the Code allows a bank to charge-back a provisional settlement
with its customer if the bank fails to receive a final settlement and this
right of charge-back is not affected by prior use of the credit given for the
item.150 Although section 4.212 has been slightly revised, the change
would not affect the right of charge-back as described by the court and
143. 894 S.W.2d 828 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1995, no writ).
144. Id. at 830.
145. Id. at 829.
146. Act of May 28, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 961, §§ 1, 4, 1995 Tex. Sess. Law Serv.
4582, 4626 (Vernon).
147. See Banking Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 49 S.M.U. L. Rev. 695 (1996).
148. 893 S.W.2d 705 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1995, no writ).
149. Id. at 707-08.
150. Id. at 708. The right of a collecting bank to charge-back provisional credits given
for an item was previously stated in TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 4.212 (Tex. UCC)




the result in the case would remain the same. 151
B. REFUSAL TO PAY CASHIER'S CHECKS
In contrast to Bill Hart Auto Sales, the decision in Arline v.
Omnibank152 would be reversed under the new Code. In Arline, the
plaintiff's father had originally opened a joint account at the bank with
another person and, under the terms of the signature card, the funds in
the account were payable to the survivor in the event of the death of
either party.1 53 After the father's death, the bank issued a new signature
card naming the survivor as one of the owners of a "new" account jointly
owned by the survivor and a third person. 154 But, the account number
remained the same. 155 When the plaintiff later asked the bank to issue a
cashier's check to him as administrator of his father's estate, the bank
mistakenly did so in an amount equal to the balance in the "new" joint
account. 156 When the plaintiff later attempted to obtain payment of the
cashier's check, payment was refused and the check was stamped "pay-
ment stopped."'1 57
The plaintiff, acting in his capacity as administrator of his father's es-
tate, sued the bank to compel payment of the cashier's check for the ben-
efit of the estate.' 58 Noting that "[t]he issue of whether a bank can
dishonor its cashier's check when no person has changed his position in
expectation of payment is a difficult one,"'1 59 the court carefully reviewed
cases and commentary before reluctantly concluding that Texas prece-
dent prevented a bank from refusing to pay a cashier's check even if it
was issued by mistake.160 According to the court, the only recourse for
the bank would be an action to recover money paid by mistake.' 61
The holding that a bank cannot refuse to pay a cashier's check would
151. Under the revision, a collecting bank may still charge-back after the midnight
deadline, but if the return of a check or the sending of notice of dishonor is so delayed, the
collecting bank is now liable for any loss resulting from the delay. See TEX. Bus. & COM.
CODE ANN. § 4.214(a) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1996).
152. 894 S.W.2d 76 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, no writ).
153. Id. at 77.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 80. There is no explanation in the opinion as to why the account number was
not changed. The failure to change the account number seems to have been the cause of
the bank's later mistake in issuing the disputed cashier's check.
156. Id. at 77.
157. 894 S.W.2d at 77.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 82.
160. Id. In the court's view, the critical precedent was Wertz v. Richardson Heights
Bank and Trust, 495 S.W.2d 572, 574 (Tex. 1973) (holding that a cashier's check is "not
subject to countermand by either its purchaser or the issuing bank.").
161. 894 S.W.2d at 82. Under the old Chapter 3, the Texas Supreme Court held that a
claim in restitution to recover money paid by mistake was impliedly authorized by TEX.
Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.418 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1994) and had not been displaced
by the Code. Bryan v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 628 S.W.2d 761 (Tex. 1982). The new Chapter 3
makes the right to maintain such an action explicit. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN.
§ 3.418(b) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1996).
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be changed by a new section 3.411 in the revised Code.162 Under this
section, a bank may now refuse to pay a cashier's check and may assert
any claims or defenses that it has reasonable grounds to believe are avail-
able against the holder of the cashier's check. 163 In refusing to pay, how-
ever, the bank runs the risk of liability for consequential damages if the
refusal was wrongful or if the grounds for the refusal were not
reasonable. 164
VI. INVESTMENT SECURITIES UNDER THE NEW
CHAPTER 8
A. REASONS FOR CHANGE IN CHAPTER 8
The first version of Chapter 8 adopted in Texas derived from the 1962
Official Text as approved by the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws and by the American Law Institute.165 This ver-
sion of Chapter 8 treated an investment security as something akin to a
specialized form of negotiable instrument represented by a stock certifi-
cate or similar document that could be issued in either bearer or regis-
tered form. This specialized form of negotiable instrument would be
traded between buyers and sellers on recognized exchanges like the New
York Stock Exchange with changes in ownership being reflected on the
books of the issuer.166 By the early 1970s, the growth in share trading,
the concomitant "paper crunch" of record keeping, and the physical ex-
change of stock certificates led to the revision of Chapter 8 by the 1978
Official Text which visualized a future of "paperless" stock ownership
(i.e., "uncertificated securities") with ownership still being reflected on
the issuer's books.167 The drafters of this revision were realistic enough to
recognize, however, that paper certificates would continue to exist for
some time to come. Thus, the rules governing uncertificated securities
were engrafted on the existing structure of Chapter 8 to provide some-
thing of a "parallel universe" approach with one set of rules governing
ownership represented by paper certificates and another set of rules gov-
erning paperless ownership. 168 Unforeseen by the drafters, however, was
the rise of clearing corporations and securities intermediaries as third-
party depositories who keep track of securities ownership by entries in
their participants' accounts, much as a bank keeps track of bank accounts
162. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.411 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1996).
163. Id. § 3.411(c).
164. Id. § 3.411(b).
165. The Uniform Commercial Code was originally adopted in Texas in the 1965 legis-
lative session with an effective date of July 1, 1966. Uniform Commercial Code, 59th Leg.,
R.S., ch. 721, §§ 1-101 to 10-105, 1965 Tex. Gen. Laws 1-316 (Vernon). In 1967 it was reen-
acted as part of the new Texas Business and Commerce Code. Act of Sept. 1, 1967, 60th
Leg., R.S., ch. 785, §§ 1-6, 1967 Tex. Gen. Laws 2343-2782 (Vernon).
166. PIKE & FISCHER, INC., UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE REPORTING SERVICE: UNI-
FORM COMMERCIAL CODE AND OFFICIAL COMMENTS, Revised Article 8, Investment Se-
curities, Prefatory Note 2-3 (1995).




for its customers, without the need to notify the issuer (or the United
States Treasury) of precisely who owns which dollar bill on a given day.169
In recognition of this unanticipated phenomena, Chapter 8 was com-
pletely revised in 1994 and was adopted in Texas during the 1995 legisla-
tive session.170
The new Chapter 8 still recognizes that paper certificates will be issued,
traded, and held by some investors. Also, it includes provisions to cover
uncertificated securities and third-party depositories. 171 In addition, the
revision now provides coverage for a broader range of investment owner-
ship than that traditionally viewed as a "security"'172 allowing property
held by a securities intermediary to be treated as a "financial asset"'173
whether or not the property involved is normally traded on financial mar-
kets. In sum, the new Chapter 8 can be viewed as a "tri-furcation" that
seeks to cover not only paper and paperless ownership, but also third-
party accounting for ownership of traditional investment securities and
non-traditional investments.
The details of the changes in Chapter 8 cannot be covered in the rela-
tively brief space of this Survey, but certain points can be highlighted.
First, on a rather fundamental level, the new Chapter 8 abolishes any
statute of frauds requirement for the sale or purchase of securities.174
This change alone eliminates much of the litigation that has arisen in
Texas under the prior Chapter 8.175 Second, Subchapters B, C, and D of
Chapter 8 dealing with securities represented by certificated securities in
paper form have remained largely unchanged, 176 as have the provisions
concerning ownership of uncertificated securities that are transferred on
the books of the issuer.177 Third, subchapter E of the new Chapter 8
details the rules governing the duties of security depositories with respect
to the relationships between such depositories, the owners of financial
169. Id.
170. Act of May 27, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 962, § 1, 1995 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 4760
(Vernon).
171. See and compare the various provisions cited in notes 176-78 infra.
172. "Security" is defined in TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 8.102(a)(15) (Tex. UCC)(Vernon Supp. 1996) as a share or a similar financial market participation interest. See also
TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 8.102(a)(9) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1996).
173. "Financial asset" is defined in TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 8.102(a)(9) (Tex.
UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1996). The breadth of this definition may give rise to some interest-
ing possibilities. The reader is left to his or her own imagination.
174. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 8.113 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1996). The com-
ment to this section states in part: "This section provides that the statute of frauds does not
apply to contracts for the sale of securities, reversing prior law which had a special statute
of frauds in Section 8-319 (1978) [TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 8.319 (Tex. UCC)
(Vernon 1991)]."
175. See, e.g., Coastal Corp. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 852 S.W.2d 714 (Tex. App.-
Corpus Christi 1993, no writ); Beta Drilling, Inc. v. Durkee, 821 S.W.2d 739 (Tex. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied); Gannon v. Baker, 830 S.W.2d 706 (Tex. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, writ denied), prior decision at 807 S.W.2d 793 (Tex. App.-Hous-
ton [1st Dist.] 1991), affd in part and rev'd in part, 818 S.W.2d 754 (Tex. 1991).
176. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 8.201-8.407 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1996).
177. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 8.106(d), 8.108(b)-(d), 8.112(b), (d), 8.201(a)(2)
& 8.207(a) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1996).
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assets, and the holders of security interests in these assets. 178 It is in this
third area that most attorneys are likely to encounter Chapter 8 because
of the overlap between these provisions and the conforming revisions
made to Chapter 9 on secured transactions. 179 The balance of this section
of the Survey concentrates on this area.
B. CREATION OF SECURITY INTERESTS IN INVESTMENT PROPERTY
The prior version of Chapter 8 separated the rules for the creation and
the perfection of security interests in investment securities between
Chapters 8 and 9 of the Code. 180 The revised Chapter 8 eliminates this
separation by making several conforming changes in Chapter 9 and by
adding new sections 9.115 and 9.116 to that Chapter. 181 Under the revi-
sion, a security interest in an investment security, now termed "invest-
ment property,"'182 is created in the same manner as other security
interests, that is, by an agreement between the debtor and the secured
party that complies with the terms of section 9.203.183 The basic require-
ments of section 9.203 are: (1) there must be an agreement between the
debtor and the secured party, (2) the debtor must have rights in the col-
lateral, and (3) the secured party must give value.' 8 4 The collateral must
be described in the security agreement and, on this point, the new section
9.115 states the rules governing the description of investment property
used as collateral. 185
Under Chapter 9, security interests in some types of property can be
created without a written security agreement, most notably in cases
where the secured party takes physical possession of the collateral. 186
Revised Chapter 8 allows the same treatment for some investment
178. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 8.501-8.511 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1996).
179. In making this statement the author presumes that relatively few attorneys regu-
larly represent issuers and transfer agents in regard to the form of stock to be issued,
whether certificated or uncertificated, but that many attorneys may represent financial in-
stitutions or other lenders who are asked to make loans against securities or other financial
assets that have already been issued.
180. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §9 9.203(a), 8.321 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1991).
181. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 9.115, 9.116 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1996).
182. "Investment property" is defined in the new TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN.
§ 9.115(a)(6) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1996) to include certificated and uncertificated
securities, securities entitlements, securities accounts, commodity contracts, and commod-
ity accounts. Because of the broader coverage of the revised Chapter 8, the term "invest-
ment property" was substituted for the earlier "investment security" term.
183. The cross-reference that formerly appeared in TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN.§ 9.203(a) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1991) to TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 8.321 (Tex.
UCC) (Vernon 1991) has now been removed. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN.
§ 9.203(a) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1996).
184. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.203(a)(1)-(3) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1996).
185. The test of a description provided by TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.115(c)
(Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1996) is, "A description of investment property collateral in a
security agreement or financing statement is sufficient if it identifies the collateral by spe-
cific listing, by category, by quantity, by a computational or allocational formula or proce-
dure, or by any other method, if the identity of the collateral is objectively determinable."
Id.
186. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 9.203(a)(1) & 9.305 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon
Supp. 1996).
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properties. Under section 9.115, "[i]f a security certificate in registered
form is delivered to a secured party pursuant to agreement, a written se-
curity agreement is not required for [the] attachment or enforceability of
the security interest [and] delivery [of the certificate] suffices for perfec-
tion of the security interest .... ",187 A security interest created and
perfected in this manner has priority over a conflicting security interest
perfected by the filing of a financing statement.'88
Security interests may also attach to certain "financial assets" by opera-
tion of law in two limited situations.189 First, if a person buys a financial
asset through a "securities intermediary" 190 under an agreement obligat-
ing the buyer to pay the purchase price when the purchase is effected, and
the intermediary credits the asset to the buyer's account before the price
is paid, the intermediary obtains a security interest in the buyer's "secur-
ity entitlement"'1 91 without the need for a security agreement. The secur-
ity interest is automatically perfected by operation of law.' 92 This
security interest has priority over any competing security interest.' 93 Sec-
ond, if a certificated security, or other financial asset represented by a
writing which is usually transferred by delivery with any necessary in-
dorsement or assignment, is delivered under an agreement between per-
sons in the business of dealing with such securities or assets, the right to
receive payment is secured by operation of law and no security agree-
ment is necessary for attachment. The security interest is automatically
perfected. 194
187. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.115(f) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1996). In
effect, this is equivalent to a common law possessory pledge. A "security certificate" is
defined in TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 8.102(a)(16) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1996)
as "a certificate representing a security."
188. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.115(f) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1996).
189. "Financial asset" is defined in TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 8.102(a)(9) (Tex.
UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1996) and includes a certificated or uncertificated security and an
obligation, share, participation, or other interest that is of a type dealt in or traded on
financial markets or that is recognized as a medium for investment. The term also includes
"any property ... held by a securities intermediary for another person in a securities ac-
count if the securities intermediary has expressly agreed .. .that the property is to be
treated as a financial asset" governed by Chapter 8. Id.
190. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 8.102(a)(14) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1996)
defines a "securities intermediary" to include clearing corporations, banks, or brokers that,
in the ordinary course of business, maintain securities accounts for others.
191. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 8.102(a)(17) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1996) defines
"security entitlement" as "the rights and property interest of an entitlement holder with
respect to a financial asset."
192. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.116(a) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1996). This is
a codification of the common law "broker's lien" to secure payment of the purchase price
for the securities. It is, in effect, another version of the "purchase money security interest"
described in TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.107 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1991).
193. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.115(e)(3) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1996).
194. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.116(b) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1996). This
exception is obviously very narrow and will typically be of importance only between securi-
ties custodians who deliver certificates between themselves to execute instructions from
buyers and sellers of securities. The Official Comment notes that this section is a codifica-
tion of the understanding of the trade. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.116 cmt. 3 (Tex.
UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1996).
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C. PERFECTION OF SECURITY INTERESTS IN INVESTMENT PROPERTY
The changes made by the revised Chapter 8 and the conforming
amendments in Chapter 9 are perhaps most striking in the area of perfec-
tion of a security interest in investment property. Here the revision in-
troduces the concept of perfection by "control."'195 Perfection by control
essentially means that the secured party has sufficient control over the
collateral to permit the secured party to sell the collateral without the
need for any further cooperation from the debtor. The easiest case in
which to visualize such control is a situation involving the possession of
properly indorsed and publicly traded stock certificates by a lender. If the
loan goes into default, the lender can simply sell the stock and recover
the amount of the loan from the proceeds of the sale.' 96
In addition to physical possession of a stock certificate, a secured party
may establish "control" over investment property in two other ways: (1)
if securities are transferred to an account in the secured party's own
name, or (2) if a securities intermediary agrees to act on an instruction of
the secured party to sell the securities, even though the debtor retains
ownership rights in them.' 97 Although the revision uses different terms,
the concept of "control" in the case of investment property is analogous
to the concept of control over the goods where a warehouse receipt or bill
of lading has been issued by a warehouse or carrier. If negotiable, perfec-
tion in a warehouse receipt or bill of lading is accomplished by posses-
sion. 198 If non-negotiable, perfection is accomplished by notification to
the bailee that the goods are being held on behalf of the secured party.199
However, there is a significant difference in this analogy. In the case of
bailed goods covered by a non-negotiable document of title, perfection
dates from the time the bailee receives notification of the secured party's
interest.200 In the case of uncertificated securities or securities entitle-
ments, an issuer or securities intermediary is not required to enter into an
agreement to follow the instructions of the secured party even if the
debtor, as owner of the securities or entitlements, so directs. 20' The
195. "Control" is defined in TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 8.106, 9.115(1)(e) (Tex.
UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1996). Under Chapter 8, the term "purchaser" is used as defined in
TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.201(33) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1991) to include a secured
party. It is in this sense that the word is used in TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 8.106
(Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1996) and includes secured parties even though the section
speaks in terms of control by a purchaser.
196. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.504(a) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1991). In this
case, since the stock is traded on a recognized market, the secured party is also free of the
usual strictures regarding notice of sale under TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.504(c)
(Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1991). Under that same section, the secured party is even entitled to
buy the collateral without the need for public sale.
197. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 8.106(b), (c), 9.115(a)(5) (Tex. UCC)
(Vernon Supp. 1996).
198. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.304(b) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1991).
199. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.304(c) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1991).
200. Id.
201. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN, § 8.106(0 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1996). This
section also provides that an intermediary may not enter into such an agreement without
the consent of the owner or entitlement holder. Id § 8.106(g).
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bailee of goods does not have this choice. Perfection by control of com-
modity contracts is defined in a similar manner in section 9.115.202
Short of obtaining control by one of the methods provided in sections
9.115 and 8.106, a secured party may elect to file an ordinary financing
statement covering the investment property. 20 3 Perfection by filing is a
less desirable method of perfection since a security interest perfected by
control has priority over a security interest perfected by filing.204
D. PRIORITY OF SECURITY INTERESTS IN INVESTMENT PROPERTY
The rules governing priority in the investment property appear in sec-
tion 9.115 of the revised Code.205 The most basic rule is that a security
interest perfected by control over the investment property has priority
over a security interest that is not perfected by control. For example, a
security interest perfected by control has priority over a security interest
perfected by filing.206 If more than one secured party has perfected by
control, the security interests rank equally except for security interests
granted to the debtor's own security or commodity intermediary, which
have a super-priority over any security interest granted to another se-
cured party.20 7 If a broker, a securities intermediary, or a commodities
intermediary is the debtor, any security interest granted by these parties
that is not perfected by control rank equally. 208 Any cases not resolved
by these rules are governed by the general priority rules of section
9.312.209 Such an unresolved case could occur, for example, if two se-
202. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.115(d)(4) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1996).
203. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.115(d)(2) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1996).
204. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.115(e)(1) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1996).
205. The perfection of security interests in investment property can involve some com-
plex choice of law issues. TEX. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. § 9.103(f) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon
Supp. 1996) now details the choice of law rules to be used in determining which jurisdic-
tion's law controls perfection and priorities. In general, if the investment property is repre-
sented by a security certificate, and if perfection is accomplished by control, the law of thejurisdiction where the certificate is located governs. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN.
§ 9.103(f)(2) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1996). If the investment property is in the form of
an uncertificated security, and if perfection is by means of control, the law of the jurisdic-
tion of the issuer governs. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.103(f)(3) (Tex. UCC)
(Vernon Supp. 1996). If the investment property is a security entitlement or security ac-
count, and if perfection is by means of control, the law of the securities intermediary'sjurisdiction governs. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.103(f)(4) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon
Supp. 1996). If the investment property consists of a commodity contract or commodity
account, and if perfection is by means of control, the law of the jurisdiction of the commod-
ity intermediary governs. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.103(f)(5) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon
Supp. 1996). If perfection is by filing, or by automatic perfection in the case of security
interests granted by brokers or intermediaries (whether stocks or commodities), the law of
the debtor's location governs. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.103(f)(6) (Tex. UCC)
(Vernon Supp. 1996).
206. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.115(e) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1996).
207. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.115(e)(2) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1996).
208. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.115(e)(5) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1996).
209. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.115(e)(6) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1996).
This section expressly cross-references TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 9.312(e)-(g) (Tex.
UCC) (Vernon 1991) and specifies that the purchase money rule of TEX. Bus. & COM.
CODE ANN. § 9.312(d) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1991) does not apply to investment property.
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cured parties each perfected by filing instead of by control. In this in-
stance, priority would be determined by the order of filing under section
9.312.210
VII. SECURED TRANSACTIONS
A. PERFECTION OF SECURITY INTERESTS
Under section 9.302 of the Code, security interests in goods covered by
a certificate of title must be perfected by notation on the certificate rather
than by the filing of a financing statement.211 In the case of automobiles,
even if the security interest is not perfected by notation on the certificate
of title, the Texas courts have held that the secured party still prevails
over the buyer of an automobile if the certificate of title is not transferred
to the buyer as part of the sales transaction. 212 Does the same rule apply
in the case of boats? According to the court in Pierce v. First National
Bank of Alvin,21 3 the answer is no. The reason for this difference is that
perfection of security interests in boats and boat motors is governed by
the Texas Parks and Wildlife Code rather than by the Texas Certificate of
Title Act.214 The court correctly reasoned that the Parks and Wildlife
Code does not render a sale void if a certificate of title is not transferred
as part of the sale. 215 Because the sale is not made void, the transaction is
governed by section 9.301 of the Code, and that section gives the pur-
chaser priority over an unperfected security interest if the purchaser ac-
ted without knowledge of the security interest.216 This disparity in result
is another example of a situation where serious thought should be given
to finding a better system for perfecting and tracking security interests in
different types of collateral.2 17 A strong argument can be made that the
lack of correlation between the Code and other statutes dealing with the
210. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.312(e) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1991).
211. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.302(c)(2) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1991).
212. This rule originated in Phil Phillips Ford, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co.,
465 S.W.2d 933 (Tex. 1971) and has been followed in subsequent decisions. See, e.g., Drake
Ins. Co. v. King, 606 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. 1980) (buyer obtains no title to automobile unless
certificate is transferred as part of sale) and 620 S.W.2d 739 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1981, writ
ref'd n.r.e.) (same, holding that buyer is entitled to demand transfer of certificate of title
from seller to insure that buyer has received good title).
213. 899 S.W.2d 365 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, no writ).
214. For perfection of security interests in boats and boat motors, TEX. PARKS & WILD.
CODE ANN. § 31.052 (Vernon Supp. 1996) provides for notation on a certificate of title
issued by the Parks and Wildlife Department. TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 6687-1,§ 41
(Vernon 1991) provides that perfection of security interests in automobiles is by notation
on a certificate of title issued by the Texas Department of Transportation.
215. 899 S.W.2d at 370.
216. Id. at 370-71.
217. Another example is Giese v. NCNB Tex. Forney Banking Center, 881 S.W.2d 776
(Tex. App.-Dallas 1994, no writ) where a seller's attempt to continue perfection of her
security interest in a mobile home by a fixture filing in the real estate records was held to
be ineffective so long as a certificate of title issued by the Texas Department of Licensing
and Regulation was outstanding on the home. This department is yet another issuer of
certificates of title for another class of property that requires one more record to be
checked. The relevant certificate of title statute for mobile homes is TEX. REv. Civ. STAT.
ANN. art. 5221f, § 19 (Vernon 1991).
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perfection of security interests is needlessly complex and adds unneces-
sary expense to the transaction costs for all parties involved.218
In Crutcher v. Continental National Bank,219 a bank had taken security
interests in twenty-seven trailers as part of the security for a letter of
credit issued on behalf of the owners of a distributing company.220 The
liens were perfected by notation on the certificates of title.22' When the
owners subsequently sold the company, they requested that and the un-
used letter of credit be canceled and the liens on the trailers released.222
The former owners retained the certificates of title as partial security in
the sale of the company, but did not have their liens noted on the titles.
The purchaser subsequently misrepresented to the bank that the original
certificates had been lost or destroyed, and a new statement was needed
showing that the bank's liens had been released. Armed with the state-
ment of release, the purchaser obtained new, clean certificates of title and
sold some of the trailers to other parties. The purchaser eventually de-
faulted in making payments to the original owners of the company and
they belatedly sought to have their liens noted on the certificates of title.
At that time they learned, to their dismay, that clean titles had been is-
sued to the purchaser and that some of the collateral was missing. After
obtaining a judgment against the purchaser, the owners sued the bank,
arguing that the bank owed a duty to notify them when the purchaser
sought the additional lien release.2 2 3 The court held that there was no
banking relationship between the bank and the owners as the letter of
credit was canceled more than three years earlier, and the bank owed no
continuing duty, whether fiduciary or otherwise, to notify the owners
when the purchaser, as the title owner of the vehicles, sought a statement
showing that the bank's liens had been released.224 The owners could
have perfected their security interests by notation on the certificates of
title when the company was sold or at any time before clean certificates
were issued. Having failed to take this step, the owners' only recourse
was against the defaulting purchaser.22 5
B. RECOVERY OF DEFICIENCIES
Much of the litigation arising under Chapter 9 concerns the right of a
secured party to recover a deficiency after default and disposition of col-
218. For a discussion of the benefits and defects of filing systems as a means of perfect-
ing security interests, as well as an analysis of the associated costs, see James W. Bowers,
Of Bureaucrats' Brothers-in-law and Bankruptcy Taxes: Article 9 Filing Systems and the
Market for Information, 79 MINN. L. REV. 721 (1995).
219. 884 S.W.2d 884 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1994, no writ).
220. Id. at 885.
221. Id. Notation of a lien on vehicles, trailers, and the like is accomplished by the
issuance of a certificate of title by the Department of Transportation showing the existence
of a security interest in the collateral covered by the certificate. TEX. REv. Civ. STAT.
ANN. art. 6687-1 § 41 (Vernon Supp. 1996).
222. 884 S.W.2d at 885.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 887.
225. Id. at 889.
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lateral, and this Survey period was no exception. In Hairgrove v. Cramer
Financial Groups, Inc.,226 the court had little difficulty in holding that the
sale of a loan with an accompanying assignment of the secured party's
rights in the collateral was not a "disposition" of the collateral under sec-
tion 9.504 of the Code. Also, there was no requirement that the debtor
be notified of the sale and assignment. 227
In Long v. NCNB-Texas National Bank,228 there had clearly been a
foreclosure sale, but the collateral in that case was real estate, and the
deficiency claim was against the guarantors who had guaranteed the origi-
nal loan. Notice of the foreclosure was given to the principal debtor, but
separate notice was not given to the guarantors.2 29 In the deficiency ac-
tion, the guarantors argued that they were "debtors" within the meaning
of the Texas Property Code and, as such, were entitled to notice of the
foreclosure sale.230 The court noted that the requirements of Chapter 9
of the Code only apply to foreclosures on personal property and not to
foreclosures on realty.2 31 The underlying question, however, was whether
the interpretation of the term "debtor" under sections 9.504 and 9.505 of
the Code to include guarantors should be extended to the same term
under the Property Code. 232 On this point, the court reviewed the history
and purpose of the Texas real property statutes and concluded that the
express use of the terms "guarantor" and "guarantors" in some sections
of the Property Code, and omission of those terms in the sections dealing
with notice, indicated a legislative intent that guarantors do not have a
right to notice of a foreclosure sale of real estate.2 33
226. 895 S.W.2d 874 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1995, writ denied).
227. Id. at 875. As used in TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.504(c) (Tex. UCC)
(Vernon 1991), a disposition of collateral occurs when the secured party seeks to foreclose
on the collateral for the purpose of liquidating it and applying the proceeds to the out-
standing indebtedness. The sale of a loan, along with the secured party's rights, under a
security agreement is not a foreclosure.
228. 882 S.W.2d 861 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1994, no writ).
229. Id. at 862.
230. Id. at 863. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 51.002(b)(3) (Vernon 1995) requires that
notice of a foreclosure sale be given to "each debtor who, according to the records of the
holder of the debt, is obligated to pay the debt."
231. Id. at 863-64. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.104(10) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon
1991) explicitly states that it does not cover "the creation or transfer of an interest in or
lien on real estate."
232. 882 S.W.2d at 864. The right of guarantors to receive notice of a disposition of
collateral under TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 9.504, 9.505 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1991)
is well-established in Texas law. See, e.g., FDIC v. Payne, 973 F.2d 403 (5th Cir. 1992)
(guarantor entitled to notice of sale of collateral; right not waived by pre-default waiver of
notice of sale contained in guaranty agreement because § 9.504(c) allows only post-default
waivers to be effective); Bexar County Nat'l Bank v. Hernandez, 716 S.W.2d 938 (Tex.
1986) (notice is required for proper sale of collateral); and MBank Dallas v. Sunbelt
Manuf., Inc., 710 S.W.2d 633 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (notice to guaran-
tors is required before sale of collateral, but oral notice is sufficient to satisfy the require-
ments of 9.504).
233. 882 S.W.2d at 865-66. The court placed particular emphasis on TEX. PROP. CODE
ANN. §§ 51.003, 9.005 (Vernon Supp. 1996) to show a legislative intent to include guaran-
tors within the scope of the statute. Long contains an extensive review of the Texas cases
and statutory law on the issue of notice to guarantors and should be a valuable reference
source for cases involving this issue.
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The burden of pleading and proving that a disposition of collateral was
conducted properly was settled in Greathouse v. Charter National Bank-
Southwest.234 Despite the resolution of this question, the more mundane
issue of exactly what must be pled and proven still remains, as illustrated
in Wilson v. General Motors Acceptance Corp.235 In an opinion that
should bring joy to the heart of every secured creditor, a majority of the
court held that the secured party met the requirements of Greathouse
with pleadings and a motion for summary judgment that never used the
phrase "commercially reasonable" nor alleged that all conditions prece-
dent to the sale had occurred.236 The majority found that an affidavit
submitted in support of the motion was sufficient to establish the com-
mercial reasonableness of the sale and shift the burden to the debtors to
raise a fact issue that effectively contested notice and sale.237 In the ma-
jority's view, the debtors did not carry this burden and summary judg-
ment was affirmed in favor of the secured party.238 A strong dissenting
opinion argued that the requirements of Greathouse had not been met
when the secured party failed to allege in any of the pleadings that the
sale was conducted in a commercially reasonable manner and that all
conditions precedent had been met.239 The dissent would have remanded
the case for trial.240 Whether other courts will follow the "pleadings lite"
flavor of this case remains to be seen, but a secured party would be well-
advised to be cautious in relying on this case as a guide to pleading a
deficiency claim.
234. 851 S.W.2d 173 (Tex. 1992).
235. 897 S.W.2d 818 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, no writ).
236. Id. at 822.
237. Id. In terms of short-form affidavits, the affidavit described in the opinion is a
masterpiece. As summarized in both the majority and dissenting opinions, the affidavit
established six points, each of them only one line long. Id. at 822, 825.
238. Id. at 823.
239. Id. at 824.
240. 897 S.W.2d at 825.
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